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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the works of French philosopher, Michel Foucault and examines its 
implications for understanding power and social relations. Despite this, there has been very little 
Foucauldian analysis of social science and its relationship to power (Powell 2012). Hence, the article 
discusses the relationship between Foucault‟s conceptual tools of „power‟, the emergence of „the 
modern subject‟, the individual and the important concept of „body‟ as they apply to a methodological 
and epistemological understanding of social science in contemporary society. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Michel Foucault‟s research excavations covered a wide range of topics and have been 
influential across a variety of social science disciplines. Foucault was a 'masked philosopher' 
who deliberately sought to avoid being aligned with any particular school of philosophical or 
philosophical thought. Despite this preference, writers have identified affiliations, influences 
and the productivity of encounters with the work of other scholars and traditions: Nietzsche 
and Weber (Braidotti 1991; Owen 1997); Marx (Smart 1983); Kuhn (Dreyfus and Rabinow 
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1982); Gramsci (Kenway 1990) feminisms (Sawicki 1991; McNay 1994) and Habermas 
(Ashenden and Owen 1999). Commentators have also suggested new terminologies to capture 
the essence of his approach: „interpretative analytics‟ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, „modes of 
information‟ (Poster 1984) „governmentality studies‟ (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; 
Dean 2007) and the analysis of „dispositifs‟ (Deleuze 1992). In addition, his ideas have 
become influential in a variety of fields of investigation aside from generic social science 
studies: criminology (Garland 1985), management and organization (Knights and McCabe 
2003), social science research (Kendall and Wickham 1999), philosophy (Armstrong 1992) 
and sociology and politics (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991). 
Foucault‟s rejects any allusion to certainty in social science and political life and holds 
that there is no universal understanding beyond history – placing him at odds with currents in 
Marxism, as well as rationalist thought in general. That noted we can find imperatives which 
receive differing degree of emphasis throughout his work, one of which is "to discover the 
relations of specific scientific disciplines and particular social science practices" (Rabinow 
1984, 4). He has engendered an awareness that disciplines, institutions and social science 
practices operate according to logics that are at variance with the humanist visions that are 
assumed to be social science are embedded (Powell and Biggs, 1999, 2000). In other words, 
the overt meanings given to activities do not correspond to their overall consequences. 
Whether these outcomes are intended or accidental was less important to Foucault than the 
analysis of power. As Barry Smart (1983, 77) points out, Foucauldian analysis asks of power: 
'how is it exercised; by what means?' and second, 'what are the effects of the exercise of 
power?' Within those strategies and tactics, investigation would need to be centred on the 
mechanisms, the 'technologies' employed and to the consequences of change. 
One example of this disjuncture between humanist vision and social science practices 
and its effects on the direction of modernity derives from Foucault's (1977) analysis of 
“utilitarianism”. A pervasive theme of Foucault's work is the way in which the panopticon 
technique 'would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything perfectly' (1977, 173). 
Foucault describes how panopticism (based on the design of the utilitarian philosopher and 
social science reformer Jeremy Bentham) becomes a process whereby certain mechanisms 
permeate social science systems beyond actual, physical institutions. Techniques are thus 
'broken down into flexible methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted ... (as)... 
centres of observation disseminated throughout society' (1977, 211-2). 
The mechanisms used to extend the reach of centres of power through the social science 
body will vary depending on the grounds upon which they are required to operate. There are, 
in other words, periods in which particular sites and forms of conduct are subject to novel 
mechanisms and technologies in order to facilitate the transition from one state of affairs to 
another (Butler, 2000). These technologies may be overtly applied during periods of flux until 
moral relations have been accepted, whilst during the process of their application they both 
modify and are modified by the individuals or groupings charged with their implementation. 
Although Foucault does not impose any sense of causality on the development of such 
discourses, it is possible to discern the need for both an explicit moral reason and a method of 
operation, shaped to whatever new contexts are appropriate.  
As Rouse (1994) has pointed out, an examination of the relationship between power and 
knowledge is central to interpreting and understanding social science phenomena via a 
Foucauldian framework. One of the consequences of power and knowledge is that rather than 
the focus on the explicit use of a particular technique of knowledge by someone in power to 
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cause a certain effect, attention is drawn to the reflexive relationship between both elements. 
This leads to a concern with: 'the epistemic context within which those bodies of knowledge 
become intelligible and authoritative. How statements were organised thematically, which of 
those statements counted as serious, who was empowered to speak seriously, and what 
questions and procedures were relevant to assess the credibility of those statements that were 
taken seriously. ...The types of objects in their domains were not already demarcated, but 
came into existence only contemporaneous with the discursive formations that made it 
possible to talk about them' (Rouse 1994: 93). 
So, just as knowledge shapes what action is possible and what power is exercised, those 
actions also shape the creation of new knowledge and what is thereby given credence. Over 
time, legitimate 'domains' are established which both define what is real and what can be done 
about it. Other possible interpretations are simultaneously discounted and delegitimised. The 
result is a view and mode of practice in which power and knowledge support each other. 
These domains not only sustain, for example, certain professional discourses, they mould 
what those professions might become. This analysis of power and knowledge emphasises 
their entwinement and the processes that occur as a particular domain takes shape. It also 
marks a distinction between what a method for both understanding and obtaining knowledge 
produces and the relationship between the shaping of that product and the distribution of 
power. 
How did Foucault proceed to „uncovering‟ discourses and practices? An answer to this 
question requires an analysis of archaeology and genealogy and we turn to this in the next 
section of the article. It is important to examine these concepts as contextual backdrops for 
understanding his approach to subjectivity in the subsequent section, before finally moving on 
to consider the legacy of his work. 
 
 
2.  TOOLS FOR THINKING 
2. 1. Archaeology 
It is through “historical investigation” that scholars can understand the present. 
However, when utilising historical inquiry, scholars should “use it, to deform it, to make it 
groan and protest” (Foucault 1980, 54). In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault (1972) 
discusses “archaeology” as the analysis of a statement as it occurs in the historical archive. 
Further, archaeology “describes discourses as practices specified in the element of the 
archive” (1972, 131), the archive being “the general system of the formation and 
transformation of statements” (1972, 130). Whilst an understanding of language would ask 
what rules have provided for a particular statement, the analysis of discourse asks a different 
question: “how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?” (1972,  27). 
The use of an archaeological method explores the networks of what is said and what can 
be seen in a set of social science arrangements: in the conduct of an archaeology there is a 
visibility in “opening up” statements. For example, the work of Brooke-Ross (1986) 
illustrates how the rise of “residential care” in western social science produces statements 
about the “residents old age” while statements about “their ageing” produces forms of 
visibility which reinforce the power of residential care. Such visibility is consolidated by 
resource allocation; the cost of residential care stands at £8 billion per year (Powell, 2012) - 
hence the consolidation of statements pertaining to ageing reinforces institutions such as 
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residential care and the revenue they generate. In this context archaeology charts the 
relationship between statements and the visible and those „institutions‟ which acquire 
authority and provide limits within which discursive objects may exist.  
In this approach we can see that the attempt to understand the relations between 
statements and visibility focuses on those set of statements that make up institutions such as 
prisons – instructions to prison officers, statements about time-tabling of activities for inmates 
and the structure and space of the carceral institution itself. This leads to the production of: „a 
whole micro - penality of time (lateness, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity 
(inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech 
(idle chatter, insolence), of the body (incorrect attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of 
cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, indecency)‟ (Foucault 1977, 178). 
The crucial point is that this approach draws our attention to the dynamic inter-
relationship between statements and institutions. Secondly, the attempt to describe 
“institutions” which acquire authority and provide limits within which discursive objects may 
act, focuses again on the institution which delimits the range of activities of discursive objects 
(Powell & Biggs, 2000) – it is at this point that an exploration of the architectural features of 
the institution would be used to understand spatial arrangements. In a similar context, 
Goffman (1968) wrote about how spatial arrangements of „total institutions‟ operate to 
provide care and rehabilitation at an official level and capacity, underneath the surface. Such 
institutions curtail the rights of those within them: „Many total institutions, most of the time, 
seem to function merely as storage dumps for inmates ... but they usually present themselves 
to the public as rational organizations designed consciously, through and through, as effective 
machines for producing a few officially avowed and officially approved ends‟ (Goffman 
1968, 73). 
A fundamental difference between Goffman and Foucault‟s interpretations of 
institutions would be, however, that whereas Goffman sees total institutions as an aberration, 
untypical of society as a whole, Foucault‟s critique assumes that the carceral element of 
institutional life encapsulates a core feature of social science life. In order to get a better 
understanding of what is punished and why, I wanted to ask the question: how does one 
punish?‟ (Foucault 1989, 276). 
Foucault never felt totally comfortable with archaeological analysis and felt that 
discourses did not reveal the irregularities between on going within social science practices. 
As a result he developed his methodology during the course of his investigations. 
 
2. 2. Genealogy 
Foucault acquired the concept of “genealogy” from the writings of Nietzsche. 
Genealogy still maintains elements of archaeology including the analysis of statements in the 
“archive” (Foucault 1977, 1980 and 1982). With genealogy Foucault (1977) added a concern 
with the analysis of power/knowledge which manifests itself in the “history of the present”. 
As Rose (1984) points out, genealogy concerns itself with disreputable origins and 
“unpalatable functions”. This can, for example, be seen in relation to psycho-casework, care 
management and probation practice (Biggs and Powell 1999, 2001; May 1991; 1994). As 
Foucault found in his exploration of psychiatric power: „Couldn‟t the interweaving effects of 
power and knowledge be grasped with greater certainty in the case of a science as „dubious‟ 
as psychiatry?‟ (1980, 109). 
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Genealogy can be distinguished from archaeology in it approach to discourse. Whereas 
archaeology provides a snapshot, a „slice‟ through the discursive nexus, genealogy focuses on 
the processual aspects of the web of discourse – its ongoing character (Foucault, 1980). 
Foucault did attempt to make the difference between them explicit: „If we were to characterise 
it in two terms, then „archaeology‟ would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of 
local discursiveness, and „genealogy‟ would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the 
descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledge‟s which were thus released 
would be brought into play‟ (Foucault 1980, 85).  
Foucault is claiming that archaeology is a systematic method of investigating official 
statements such as dispostifs (McNay, 1994). Genealogy is a way of putting archaeology to 
practical effect, a way of linking it to social science concerns: „A genealogy of values, 
morality, asceticism, and knowledge will never confuse itself with a question for their 
„origins‟, will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history. On the contrary, it will 
cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously 
attentive to their petty malice; it will await their emergence, once unmasked, as the face of the 
other. Wherever it is made to go, it will not be reticent – in „excavating the depths‟, in 
allowing time for these elements to escape from a labyrinth where not truth had ever detained 
them. The genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin, somewhat in the 
manner of the pious philosopher who needs a doctor to exorcise the shadow of his soul‟ 
(Foucault 1984, 80). 
 
 
3.  THE MAKING OF THE MODERN SUBJECT 
 
Foucault‟s use of genealogy cannot be divorced from an understanding of power, nor 
can the constitution of the subject. With this in mind our approach will be to consider his 
analytical ingenuity via an examination of different modes through which 'subjectivity' is 
constituted. Foucault (1982, 1983) grounded this as a pivotal mode of analysis that has been 
deployed in reflections on his own life (Miller, 1993). Subjectivity appears as both an 
experiential and discursive strategy that 'goes beyond theory' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983) 
and provides us with a way to problematise the explanatory value and relevance of his 
analyses.  
We will discuss Foucault‟s approach to subjectivity in terms of classification, dividing 
and self-subjectification practices. These operate in ways to structure subjectivity under the 
auspices of the 'rise of modernity' where, commencing in the seventeenth century, the social 
science sciences, early capitalism and institutions began to co-ordinate new ways of 
objectifying 'populations' in western societies. In Foucault's analysis the realm of the 'social 
science' becomes the object of enquiry. Here, the term „social science‟ means: „The entire 
range of methods which make the members of a society relatively safe from the effects of 
economic fluctuation by providing a certain security‟ (Donzelot 1980 p. xxvi). Thus, in 
Discipline and Punish, the study: „traces the historical emergence of the social science as a 
domain or field of inquiry and intervention, a space structured by a multiplicity of discourses 
emanating from the human sciences which, in their turn, are derived from, yet provide, a 
range of methods and techniques for regulating and ordering the social science domain‟ 
(Smart 1983). 
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3. 1. Classification Practices 
Foucault's (1980) main concern was to show that the 'truth' status of a knowledge 
derives from the field in which it, as a discourse, is employed and not from the interpretation 
of a subjects' thoughts or intentions. Discourses are powerful in that they operate as a set of 
rules informing thought and practice and the operation of these decides who or what is 
constituted as an object of knowledge. The relationship between the subject and truth should 
be viewed as an effect of knowledge itself. Quite simply, the subject is not the source of truth. 
As Foucault put it: „what if understanding the relation of the subject to the truth, were just an 
effect of knowledge? What if understanding were a complex, multiple, non-individual 
formation, not `subjected to the subject', which produced effects of truth?‟ (Foucault in Elders 
1974: 149).  
Knowledge is not separate from the realm of `practice'. Knowledge is a practice that 
constitutes particular objects – non-philosophical elements – that are part of practice itself. 
Knowledge and the subject of knowledge are fused as part of the relationship between 
knowledge and power that is social sciencely constructed: „The important thing here, I 
believe, is that truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history 
and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of 
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. 
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. 
And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its `general 
politics' of truth‟ (Foucault 1980: 131) 
Foucault is deliberately questioning the individual subjects‟ will to construct as he sets 
about exploring the relationship between „discourse‟ and „subjectivity‟. What emerges is a 
grounded understanding of power/knowledge construction and reconstruction as discourses 
transform people into types of subjects - as classifying practices. Through these techniques of 
knowing, human attributes are studied, defined, organised and codified in accordance with the 
meta-categories of what is 'normal'. Classifying practices and techniques of normalisation 
designate both the objects to be known and the subjects who have the authority to speak about 
them. Discourses thus encompass both the objective and subjective conditions of human 
relations (1973, 232) and these emerging forms of social science regulation, characterised by 
notions of discipline, surveillance and normalisation, are core to his philosophical studies 
(Foucault 1977).   
The knowledge and practices are also referred to as 'epistemes' which are “the total set 
of relations that unite at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to 
epistemological figures, sciences and formalised systems” (Foucault 1972: 191). Social 
science science disciplines, in different ways, order the status of those who can validate 
knowledge through inquiry. Foucault designates a discourse's function of dispersing subjects 
and objects as its 'enunciative modality' (Foucault 1972: 50). This modality encompasses roles 
and statuses and demarcated subject positions. Together they act to structure the space of 
regulation where the professionalisation of knowledge is instigated.   
 
3. 2. Dividing Practices 
Dividing practices are deployed in order to maintain social science order - to separate, 
categorise, normalise and institutionalise populations. In Madness and Civilization (1973a), 
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Birth of the Clinic (1975) and Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault illustrates how 
'unproductive' people were identified as political problems with the 'rise of modernity'.  
The state divided these people into 'the mad', 'the poor' and 'the delinquent' and 
subsequently disciplined them in institutions: asylums, hospitals, prisons and schools 
(Foucault 1977). These exercises of disciplinary power were targeted at the subject and 
constituted techniques in these institutions. For instance, as we noted earlier, in Discipline and 
Punish Foucault argues that since the 18th century, prison authorities increasingly employed 
subtle regulatory methods of examination, training, time-tabling and surveillance of conduct 
on offenders in which we find a whole „micro-penality‟. Overall, dividing practices are seen 
as integral to the rationalism of the Enlightenment narratives of liberty, individuality and 
rights and as fusing with governmental forms of human calculation and audit. 
 
3. 3. Self-Subjectification Practices 
The previous modes of classification and dividing practices co-exist. Professions 
examine, calculate and classify the groups that governments and institutions regulate, 
discipline and divide. The third mode of self-subjectification is more intangible. These 
practices designate the ways in which a person turns themselves into social science subjects.  
Foucault claims that self-subjectification entails the deployment of technologies of the self: 
'Techniques that permit individuals to affect, by their own means, a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own selves, modify themselves, and 
attain a certain state of perfection, happiness, purity, supernatural power' (Foucault, 1982: 10). 
In Foucault's work self-subjectification practices proliferate in the domain of sexuality 
because the occupying sciences of medicine, psychology and psychoanalysis obligate subjects 
to speak about their sexuality. In turn, these sciences characterise sexual identity as esoteric 
and dangerous (Foucault 1980). Thus, the association of sexual truth with self-subjectification 
gives 'experts' their power. 
Self-subjectification practices inter-relate with classification and dividing practices to 
construct modern subjects. For instance, subjects are created by human sciences that classify 
problems, identities and experiences; the systems of power that divide, stratify and 
institutionalise types of 'elderly' subjects and the technologies of the self that impose upon 
individuals the reflexive means to problematise themselves. What Foucault seems to be 
confronting us with  is a disturbing vision that our ideas about the depth of human experience 
are simply social science veneers that exist in an interplay between power and knowledge.  
Shumway (1989) calls this a 'strategy of exteriority': a strategy that „does not stem from a 
claim that the true being plain and visible, but from a rejection of the claim that the true is 
systematically disguised‟ (1989: 26). Foucault's analysis of subjectification practices highlight 
techniques used by administrative powers to problematise subjects and the games of truth 
employed by those who seek to know them through classification techniques.. 
 
3. 4. Subjectivity  
3. 4. 1. Three Domains 
Foucault juxtaposes his axis of classifying, dividing and self-subjectification practices 
with one that delineates three domains of subjectivity: the body, the population and the 
individual. These domains elaborate how modes of subjectivity traverse modern social 
science relations. 
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3. 4. 2. The Body 
The 'body' is a subject of discursive and political inscription. In Discipline and Punish 
Foucault (1977) claims that penal practices produce the 'soul' of the offender by disciplining 
the body and corporealising prison spaces.  In prisons, the body's most essentialist needs - 
food, space, exercise, sleep, privacy, light and heat - become the materials upon which 
schedules, curfews, time-tables and micro-punishments are enacted. The body discipline 
developed in prisons has parallels throughout the broader disciplinary society. Indeed, the 
success of modernity's domination over efficient bodies in industry, docile bodies in prisons, 
patient bodies in clinical research and regimented bodies in schools and residential centres 
attest to Foucault's thesis that the human body is a highly adaptable terminus for the 
circulation of power relations. 
It would be a mistake to believe Foucault is alone in arguing that the rule of the body is 
fundamental to modern politico-economical and professional regimes of power. Critiques of 
the domination of the body were the mainstay of Frankfurt theorists such as Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1944) long before Foucault's work. As he noted of their work: „As far as I'm 
concerned, I think that the Frankfurt School set problems that are still being worked on. 
Among others, the effects of power that are connected to a rationality that has been 
historically and geographically defined in the West, starting from the sixteenth century on. 
The West could never have attained the economic and social science effects that are unique to 
it without the exercise of that specific form of rationality‟ (Foucault 1991, 117). Foucault's 
contribution, however, is to locate the ways in which 'bio-power' and disciplinary techniques 
construe the body as an object of knowledge.  For example, The History of Sexuality depicts 
the dominion with which 19th century experts constructed a hierarchy of sexualised bodies 
and fragmented the population into groups of 'normal', 'deviant' and 'perverted'. 
While Foucault's definition of the body has inspired numerous debates, the task of 
refinement and problematization have largely been the province of feminist scholars.  
Foucault has been criticised for his lack of sensitivity and attention to gender inequality and 
women's history thereby requiring philosophical revision in order to overcome such 
limitations (Powell and Biggs, 2000). Feminists have stressed that the body is both a site of 
regulation, where gendered identities are maintained and a site of resistance, where they are 
undone and challenged. McNay (1993) agrees with Foucault that 'sexuality is produced in the 
body in such a manner as to facilitate the regulation of social science relations' (1993, 32).  
However, contra-Foucault, she notes that not all aspects of sexuality, corporeality and desire 
are products of power relations. Passionate social science relationships based on friendship do 
not necessarily facilitate intense forms of surveillance and regulation. 'Friends' can transform 
disciplinary spaces and engage in disrupting practices. Similarly, Butler (1990, 140-141) 
claims that ritualised body performances that bind women to fictional feminine identities can 
also become deconstructive performances that expose the arbitrariness of identities. 
 
3. 4. 3. The Population 
Foucault outlines how the modern state enhanced its power by intervening in the very 
life of the 'bio-politics of the population' (1980, 139). In this process power has two poles. 
First, a pole of transformation and second, the human body as an object of control and 
manipulation. The first revolves around the notion of 'scientific categorisation': for example, 
'species' and 'population'.  
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It is these categories that become object of systematic and sustained political 
intervention. The other pole of is not 'human species' but the human body: not in its biological 
sense, but as an object of control and manipulation.  Collectively, Foucault calls these 
procedures "technologies" which centre around the 'objectification' of the body.  The overall 
aim is to forge: „a docile body that may be subjected, used, transformed and  improved‟ 
(1977, 198). 
Beginning with the inception of modernity, Western administrators rationalised their 
management of social science problems with technically efficient means of population 
control: statistics, police, health regulations and centralised welfare. Such means constituted 
governmentality: an assemblage of ruling practices, knowledge authorities and moral 
imperatives that converged on the population in order to extend the reach of the state. The 
controversial point is that governmentality is more complex than state power. Custodial 
institutions and health programmes configured individuals into sub-strata of the population. 
For example, pension policies explicate 'the elderly' as a particular group of people, while 
statistics elaborate their status as a demographic entity (an 'ageing population'). Thus, the 
disciplinary formation of subjects as a population makes possible the government of 
subjectification. 
 
3. 4. 4. The Individual 
If disciplinary gaze is a first step, then „interiorization‟ of that gaze is the second. 
Foucault's social science contructivism, consisting of classification and dividing practices, 
technologies of the self and political grids of bodies and populations has fuelled his critics 
claims that he deprives human subjectivity of agency (Smart 1983). Minson claims that 
Foucault burdens the body with being true subject of history and „the flickering counterpart to 
the dull individual of sociology‟ (1985, 93).   
Foucault emphasises two important aspects of individual agency that counteract his 
critics. First, the victims of modernity's disciplinary matrix - the prisoners, patients, and 
children - can subvert the regulatory forms of knowledge and subjectivity imposed upon 
them. Second, while power/knowledge relations construct governable individual subjects, 
such subjects are not fixed to their conditions of ruling and do become agents of resistance to 
them (Foucault 1977, 1991). To investigate the „how‟ of power then requires: „taking the 
forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point…it consists of using 
this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their 
position, find out their point of application and the methods used.  Rather than analyzing 
power relations from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing 
power relations through the antagonism of strategies‟ (1982: 211). Power is exercised on free 
subjects and guides, but does not necessarily determine, conduct. 
In this formulation the individual is not the traditional subject caught in a war between 
domination and liberation. Rather, the individual is the personal space where both active and 
passive aspects of human agency and identity surface in the context of material practices. 
Identity may be imposed through the surveillance of a subject population. This surveillance 
produces both discipline (that is, conformity to the norm), and the disciplines (regulated fields 
of knowledge and expertise). Disciplinary surveillance involves first individualizing each 
member of the population to facilitate the collation of observations across the population.   
From these observations, statistical norms are produced relating to a multitude of 
characteristics. These norms are then applied back to the subjected individuals who are 
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categorized, evaluated and acted upon according to their relation to the produced norm. 
Foucault‟s work focused on the „history of the present‟ and „power/knowledge‟ synthesis and 
how the subject was formed (Foucault, 1977 and 1978). Here Foucault‟s work is on the 
„microphysics of power‟ and the interplay of power relations, dividing practices and tactics in 
particular contexts (Foucault, 1977): the „doctor‟ and „patient‟; „prison officer‟ and „prisoner‟; 
„teacher‟ and „student‟ and „care manager‟ and „older consumer‟. 
 
 
4.  DISCUSSION 
 
„It may be that the problem about the self does not have to do with 
discovering what it is, but maybe has to do with discovering that the self is 
nothing more than a correlate of technology built into our history‟ (Foucault 
1993, 222). 
 
Foucault‟s formulation presumes the notion that individual lives are never quite 
complete and finished – that in order to function social sciencely individuals must somehow 
work on themselves to turn themselves into subjects. The notion of „technologies‟ offers the 
opportunity for a particular analysis of the sites and methods whereby certain effects on the 
subject are brought about.  
Objectifying technologies of control are, for example, those invented in conformity with 
the facets of self-understanding provided by criminality, sexuality, medicine and psychiatry 
investigated by Foucault. These are deployed within concrete institutional settings whose 
architecture testifies to the „truth‟ of the objects they contain. Thus, the possibilities of self-
experience on the part of the subject are in itself affected by the presence of someone who has 
the authority to decide that they are „truly‟ ill such as a „doctor‟ of medicine (Powell and 
Biggs, 2000). „Subjectifying‟ technologies of self-control are those through which 
individuals: „effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection 
or immortality‟ (Foucault 1988, 18).  
The important issues that Foucault raises via a questioning of the centrality of the 
subject are associated to „truthful‟ formulations of the task or the problem that certain 
domains of experience and activity pose for individuals themselves. The boundaries of self-
experience change with every acquisition, on the part of individuals, of a possibility, or a 
right, or an obligation, to state a certain „truth‟ about themselves. For example, bio-technology 
in popular social science can tell a „truth‟ of selling a dream of unspoken desire of „not 
growing old‟ to people. However, it is the self-experience of subjects that can refute, deny and 
accept the „truth‟ claims of bio-technology. In the case of lifestyles in popular social science, 
the active adoption of particular consumer practices, such as uses of bio-technology 
contributes to a narrative that is compensatory in its construction of self (Biggs and Powell, 
2001). Thus, the recourse to the notion of technologies of self is capable of accommodating 
the complexity of the „subject‟. 
Although Foucault maintained the distinction between the technologies of 
power/domination and the technologies of self, these should not be regarded as acting in 
opposition to or in isolation to one another. Indeed, Foucault frequently spoke of the 
importance of considering the contingency of both in their interaction and interdependence, 
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by identifying specific examples: „the point where the technologies of domination of 
individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon 
himself and, conversely, the points where the technologies of the self are integrated into 
structures of coercion‟ (Foucault 1993, 203). The distinction should therefore be considered 
as a heuristic device and not the portrayal of two conflicting sets of interests. Overall, we 
should see Foucault‟s entire works as providing ways of understanding social science 
relations that require on our part active interpretation, not passive regurgitation. 
To take one modern example of how we might think with, alongside (and against 
perhaps?) Foucault, take the question: how is modern bio-ethics rooted in a specific 
configuration of subjectivity? The body social sciencely represents the best hiding place, a 
hiding place of internal illnesses that remains inconspicuous until the advent of „expert‟ 
intervention. In other words, what are the effects of this problematization given its conditions 
of possibility? Subjective relations to the self will be affected to the extent that social science 
life confronts individuals with the proposition that this subjective truth – the truth of their 
relation to themselves and to others – may be revealed by „bodies‟, which are also object of 
manipulation, transformation, desire and hope. In this way we might anticipate through 
„social science‟ (Powell, 2012) the relations between illnesses, new technologies, power, the 
body and desire. While confronting an illness this involves a deliberate practice of self-
transformation and such tranformativity must pass through learning about the self from the 
truth told by personal narratives within popular social science. How is this social science and 
the body itself, however, interacting with and being changed by advances in bio-medical 
technology and the power of huge pharmaceutical companies? 
Foucault is often seen as a structuralist, along with those such as Barthes, Althusser and 
Levi-Strauss. In reply to questions which sought to make such parallels, e was consistent: „I 
am obliged to repeat it continually. I have never used any of the concept which can be 
considered characteristic of structuralism‟ (1989, 990). Perhaps the best way to view this is by 
examining his idea of historical „events'. He refuses to see events as symptomatic of deeper 
social science structures and focuses upon what seems to be marginal as indicative of 
relations of power. Events thereby differ in their capacity to produce effects. The following 
quote helps us see how this can be applied to social science analysis: „The problem is at once 
to distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, 
and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another. From 
this follows a refusal of analyses couched in terms of the symbolic field or the domain of 
signifying structures, and a recourse to analyses in terms of the genealogy of relations of 
force, strategic development, and tactics. Here I believe one's point of reference should not be 
to the great model of language (langue) and signs, but to that of war and battle” (Foucault 
1980, 114).  
What about those questions concerned with whose social science, whose identity and 
how is this produced? These are the questions that pre-occupied Foucault. His refusal to see 
power as a property of say, a particular class, immediately leaves a question over his politics 
in terms of the idea of struggle? As he said: „I label political everything that has to do with 
class struggle, and social science everything that derives from and is a consequence of the 
class struggle, expressed in human relationships and in institutions‟ (1989, 104).  
This leaves us with a question: against whom do we struggle if they are not the owners 
of power? Who creates social sciences and how might alternative forms find public 
expression and does this change anything? These questions immediately bring forth issues 
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concerning the relationship between Foucault and Marxist theory. Class structure, race and 
gender are key determinants of the position of individuals in capitalist society. It is difficult 
for 'techniques of resistance' to be mobilised when particular groups are de-commodified and 
marginalized and lose their social science worth and voice (Biggs and Powell, 2001). At the 
same time Foucault sees subjectivity not as a fabricated part of a deeper reality waiting to be 
uncovered, but an aspect of the reality systematically formulated by resistances and 
discourses. He sidesteps the binary relationship set up by Marxist theory between true and 
false realities, ways of knowing and political consciousness (Foucault 1980) and seeks to 
loosen knowledge, ideas and subject positions from categories of social science totality: for 
example, social science formation, mode of production, economy and society.  
Social science is rearticulated in Foucault's thought to historical and societal features 
ignored in those models of social science reality that „read off‟ social science according to 
deeper structures . Foucault looks to areas such as medicine, sexuality, welfare, selfhood and 
the law, and to marginalised social science groups, local politics and the micro-levels of social 
science. In these studies he found social science, discursive and historical substrata in which 
relations of domination were apparent that were not simply reducible to modes of economic 
exploitation. The idea of „governing‟ then captures the ways in which the „possible field of 
action of others‟ (Foucault 1982a:  221) are structured. Yet in inheriting this approach authors 
have produced panoptic visions in which resistance is subsumed within impersonal forces. 
This results from over-looking two main aspects in Foucault‟s work. First, in terms of his own 
question, what are the „limits of appropriation‟ of discourse‟? Without this in place, all does 
appear quiet on the battleground. Second, and relatedly, the agonism that exists between 
power and freedom (May 1999). This suggests that where there is power, there is also 
resistance; power thus presupposes a free subject.  If there is no choice in actions, there is no 
power. A slave, therefore, is not in a power relationship, but one of physical constraint 
(Foucault 1982).  
Foucault notes three types of struggle:  those against domination; those against 
exploitation and those against subjection and submission. The latter, whilst rising in 
importance in the contemporary era, do not do so to the exclusion of domination and 
exploitation as many of his followers have appeared to suggest. To understand why particular 
actors enjoy more power than others, as opposed to seeing power as a „machine in which 
everyone is caught‟ (Foucault 1980:  156), an account of resistance is needed. Because 
Foucault views freedom as part of the exercise of power, he does not provide for such an 
account.  Yet, in answer to a question concerning 'power as evil', he spoke of the need to resist 
domination in everyday life: „The problem is rather to know how you are to avoid these 
practices - where power cannot play and where it is not evil in itself‟ (Foucault  1991b:  18).  
What makes Foucault‟s overall philosophical work inspiring, is how he animates and 
locates problems of knowledge as „pieces‟ of the larger contest between modernity and its 
subjects. By downplaying the individual subject, Foucault shows how „bodies‟ and 
„populations‟ are sites were „human beings are made subjects‟ by „power/knowledge‟ 
practices (Smart, 1983, 44). To look for a possible form of trangression in order to change 
social science relation, we must examine within contemporary arrangements the possibility 
for it to be „otherwise‟. We thus find, in Foucault‟s later work, an insistence upon the 
reversibility of discourses through „resistance‟. Subjects of power are also „agents‟ who can 
strategically mobilise disjunctures in discourses and in so doing, open up the world of 
possibility in a world that seeks order through discipline and surveillance. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In his essay on Kant‟s „What is Enlightenment (Was ist Aufklärung?)? Foucault writes 
of his work as being an „historical ontology of ourselves‟ through a critique of what we do, 
say and think. He is clear throughout the essay concerning what this form of critique is not:  
neither a theory, doctrine, or body of knowledge that accumulates over time.  Instead, it is an 
attitude, „an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the 
same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with 
the possibility of going beyond them‟ (Foucault 1984: 50). What is the motivation for this 
work? „How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power 
relations?‟ (1984:  48).   
There is no „gesture of rejection‟ in this ethos. It moves beyond the „Outside-inside 
alternative‟ in the name of a critique that „consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits‟ 
(Foucault 1984: 45). The purpose being „to transform the critique conducted in the form of 
necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression‟ 
(1984: 45). Overall, it is genealogical in form:  „it will not deduce from the form of what we 
are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or 
thinking what we are, do, or think‟ (1984: 46). The ideal lies in the possibility of setting 
oneself free. To examine the internal modes of the ordering of truth, but not in the name of a 
truth that lies beyond it, is seen to open up possibilities for its transgression. 
Despite criticisms that his work lacked a normative dimension (Fraser 1989), the 
orientation for Foucault‟s approach is clear. The issue translates into one of how one-sided 
states of domination can be avoided in order to promote a two-sided relation of dialogue. The 
journey for these investigations being from how we are constituted as objects of knowledge, 
to how we are constituted as subjects of power/knowledge.  What we can take from Foucault 
is the insight that critical approaches to social science analysis cannot practice on the 
presupposition that there is an essence to humanity.  
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